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Wind is recognised as a key source of renewable energy. Despite broad public support for the sector,
wind energy proposals have routinely triggered social conﬂict and localised opposition. To promote
social acceptance and avoid conﬂict, the wind energy sector undertakes community engagement. This
paper interrogates the community engagement undertaken in King Island (Tasmania, Australia) for a
large scale wind energy development proposal which did not proceed to implementation due to external
economic factors. Despite the proponent's adoption of what was described as a ‘best practice’ community
engagement strategy, the proposal caused signiﬁcant social conﬂict for the community. In-depth inter-
views (n¼30) were conducted with members of the King Island community and were qualitatively
analysed through the social identity lens. Five key drivers of the local conﬂict were identiﬁed: proble-
matic pre-feasibility engagement; the lack of a third-party facilitator of the community consultative
committee; holding a vote which polarised the community; the lack of a clear place in the engagement
process for local opposition, and; the signiﬁcance of local context. These ﬁndings are instructive for
improving community engagement practice for wind energy and other energy generation and land use
change sectors.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Wind energy generation can be a politicised and complex issue
with consequences ranging from local to global scales (Hindmarsh,
2014; Howard 2015; Juerges and Newig, 2015). At the local level, a
stakeholder's perspective will dictate whether landscape and so-
cial impacts of proposed wind energy developments are con-
sidered beneﬁcial or burdensome (Botterill and Cockﬁeld, 2016).
Globally, the agenda for action to address climate change (e.g.
Althor et al., 2016) promotes investments in wind and other re-
newable energy sources (Batel et al., 2013; Curran, 2012; DengLtd. This is an open access article u
),
(J. Lacey).et al., 2015; Jami and Walsh 2014; Juerges and Newig 2015;
Hindmarsh 2010; Lema and Lema 2013; Wilson and Dyke 2016). In
Australia, the wind energy industry has the broad ‘in principle’
support of the public (Hobman and Ashworth, 2013), though
large-scale, commercially owned wind energy projects have been
often accompanied by conﬂict (Botterill and Cockﬁeld, 2016; Hall
and Jeanneret 2015; Hindmarsh, 2010, 2014; Wilson and Dyke
2016). While social conﬂict over land use change can contribute to
improved outcomes through exploration of a range of perspectives
and options, the introduction of wind energy is routinely char-
acterised as dysfunctional conﬂict, which is where a satisfactory
resolution is unlikely and long-term relationships are damaged
(Amason 1996; Colvin et al., 2015b). In wind energy issues in
Australia, conﬂict tends to manifest around localised opposition
(e.g. Alberts, 2007; Burningham et al., 2014; Anderson, 2013;
Kermagoret et al., 2016; Ogilvie and Roots, 2015), often motivatednder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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pacts on wildlife, loss of amenity, reduced property values, dis-
tributive and procedural fairness issues, and social disharmony
(Botterill and Cockﬁeld, 2016; Fast et al., 2016; Gross 2007; Groth
and Vogt, 2014b; Hall et al., 2013; Hindmarsh, 2010; Howard,
2015; Jami and Walsh, 2014).
In efforts to avoid dysfunctional conﬂict and local opposition,
proponents of wind energy projects commit time and resources to
undertaking community engagement as part of their planning
processes (Bell et al., 2005; Fast et al., 2016; Howard, 2015; Jami
and Walsh, 2014; Soma and Haggett, 2015). This is in response to
communities and other social actors demanding involvement in
decisions which affect them (Moffat et al., 2015; Quick and Feld-
man, 2011; Ross et al., 2016), and as a result of broader shifts to-
ward participatory processes as a norm of land use change deci-
sion-making (Colvin et al., 2016; Reed, 2008). Additionally, com-
munity engagement is a mandated requirement of environmental
and social impact assessments for wind energy development
proposals (Hindmarsh, 2010). To the wind industry, community
engagement can be viewed as a vehicle through which to obtain a
social licence to operate (SLO); an indicator of community accep-
tance which can change over the course of a project (Clean Energy
Council, 2013; Corvellec, 2007; Hall 2014; Hall and Jeanneret,
2015). However, Hindmarsh (2010) argues that the traditional
approach to community engagement for wind energy develop-
ments in Australia has been inadequate, and as a result has con-
tributed to the exacerbation of conﬂict. This inadequacy is attrib-
uted to the use of a passive approach to community engagement,
where the proponent “provides no guarantee to affected commu-
nities of any decision-making power” (Hindmarsh, 2010, p. 543).
Reﬂecting the lower levels of the ‘Spectrum of Public Participation’
(Clean Energy Council, 2013; Hindmarsh, 2010; IAP2, 2015), this
approach to community engagement limits community involve-
ment to being ‘informed’ by proponents, or providing information
to proponents for possible, but not guaranteed, incorporation into
decisions.
In contrast, a collaborative and participatory approach to
community engagement is expected to yield better outcomes for
both communities and wind energy development proponents
(Hall and Jeanneret, 2015; Hindmarsh 2010). This approach reﬂects
the higher levels of the ‘Spectrum of Public Participation’, and is an
active and transparent relationship between communities and
wind energy proponents which facilitates empowerment of the
community to inﬂuence decision-making (Hindmarsh, 2010). At-
tributes of this higher-level of community involvement which
differ from the traditional approach to community engagement
include:
 engaging community early in the proposal (Anderson, 2013;
Bell et al. 2005; Corscadden et al. 2012; Fast et al. 2016; Groth
and Vogt 2014a; Hall et al., 2013, 2015; Hindmarsh, 2010;
Hindmarsh and Matthews, 2008; Jami and Walsh, 2014);
 genuinely incorporating community input into project planning
and design (Hindmarsh, 2010; Hindmarsh and Matthews, 2008;
Jami and Walsh, 2014);
 building and maintaining trust between proponent and com-
munity (Alberts, 2007; Hall et al. 2015);
 exceeding minimum (mandated or legislated) requirements
(Anderson, 2013; Fast et al., 2016; Hall and Jeanneret, 2015;
Howard, 2015; Soma and Haggett, 2015);
 establishing community consultative committees (Fast et al.,
2016; Howard, 2015);
 forming a long-term commitment to and relationship with the
community (Anderson, 2013; Fast et al., 2016; Hindmarsh and
Matthews, 2008; Jami and Walsh, 2014; McLaren Loring, 2007);
 embedding staff locally to develop long-term relationships (Hallet al. 2015; McLaren Loring, 2007), and;
 avoiding incendiary settings, such as town-hall meetings which
can descend into a “shouting match” (Hall et al. 2015, p. 306).
Higher-level (IAP2 style) approaches to community engage-
ment have been recognised by scholars as critical for positive re-
lationships between communities and wind energy developments
(Hindmarsh, 2010), and community engagement guidelines de-
veloped with the wind energy industry reﬂect this approach as
‘best practice’ (Clean Energy Council, 2013). Nevertheless, conﬂict
accompanies many new wind energy proposals, causing social
disharmony in the candidate host communities (Botterill and
Cockﬁeld, 2015; Hindmarsh, 2010,, 2014).
This paper presents an examination of a wind energy proposal
which, despite the proponent's claim to have adopted a ‘best
practice’ approach to community engagement (Hydro Tasmania
2013c, p. 16), caused signiﬁcant social disharmony during the time
of the proposal in 20122014 in the community of King Island,
Australia (Hindmarsh, 2014; The Australian, 2013). The aim of this
research is to interrogate the King Island experience to identify
aspects of process and/or exogenous factors that contributed to the
dysfunctional local conﬂict despite the approach to community
engagement adopted by the proponent, and from this to inform
theory and practice for community engagement.
This paper ﬁrst presents a background to the King Island ex-
perience and then a description of the qualitative interview and
analysis methods. An overview of the phases and events of the
conﬂict at King Island is presented, followed by a discussion of the
key ﬁndings about the conﬂict in King Island. Finally, concluding
remarks are offered.2. Background to King Island and the TasWind proposal
King Island is located at the meeting of the Bass Strait and the
Southern Ocean, half way between mainland Australia and the
southern island state of Tasmania, which is its jurisdictional state
(Fig. 1). King Island lies in the path of strong winds; the ‘Roaring
40s’ (Khamis, 2007). The Island is approximately 1100 km2 (Coates,
2014; Jones, 2014); 64 km at its longest point and 27 km at its
widest (Khamis, 2007). The resident population in 2013 was 1605
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014), with a long-term and steady
trend of population decline (Jones, 2014). The local economy is
driven by primary production, with dairy, beef, kelp, and other
speciality products as key export commodities (Jones, 2014),
though there is a growing tourism sector in the Island (Coates,
2014).
Stabilisation of the King Island population and the related goal
of economic sustainability are key challenges for the community
(Coates, 2014; Jones, 2014). This follows closure of a scheelite mine
for tungsten in the Island in the 1990s (Suárez Sánchez et al.,
2015), and the more recent closure of the King Island abattoir in
2012 (Jones, 2014). Both signiﬁcantly dimmed the economic out-
look for the community. Additional perennial challenges include
the high cost of living, freight, and travel, and limited tele-
communications (Coates, 2014; Jones, 2014). Despite the chal-
lenges of population decline and disruption to its traditional in-
dustries, King Island is buoyed by a strong sense of community,
place, and identity (i.e. King Islanders identify as King Islanders,
not Tasmanians or Australians), and pride in the Island's clean air
and rugged and agrarian landscape. The laid-back and open
community-centric local culture is highly valued by King Islanders.
For a detailed perspective on local culture, past change, and future
prospects of King Island see Coates (2014) and Jones (2014).
It was in this context of an uncertain future for the local
economy and highly valued and cohesive community that a
Fig. 1. Location of King Island. The main town (Currie), other settlements (Grassy and Naracoopa), features (Cape Wickham and the 5 pre-existing wind turbines at Huxley
Hill), and major roads are marked. Shading indicates an approximate representation of the TasWind areas of interest (Hydro Tasmania, 2013a). Map generated using ESRI
ArcGIS (ESRI, 2011).
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nounced by Hydro Tasmania (a Tasmanian state owned corpora-
tion which produces energy from renewable sources, pre-
dominantly hydro and wind). The $2 billion ‘TasWind’ proposal
outlined plans for a 600 MW wind turbine development in King
Island to produce energy for export to mainland Australia via a
proposed undersea cable (Hydro Tasmania 2014). The TasWind
proposal included an estimated 200 turbines at 150 m in height
(Butera, 2014; Ogilvie, 2013), with a combined footprint expected
to cover 20% of the Island's area (The Australian, 2013). As the
proposal was to generate energy for export to the Australian
mainland, the TasWind proposal was to be independent of the ﬁve
wind turbines (of approximately 50 m in height) already estab-
lished on a prominent ridgeline at Huxley Hill near King Island's
main township of Currie (see Fig. 1).
The community engagement undertaken by Hydro Tasmania,
the proponents of the TasWind proposal, appeared to reﬂect a
higher-level approach to community engagement. Although lim-
ited documentation about the community engagement strategy is
publically available, materials produced by Hydro Tasmania
(2013c) during the time of the TasWind proposal describe inten-
tions to undertake an “intensive” (p. 27), “innovative” (p. 66), and
“open and transparent” (p. 16) community engagement strategy
which would reﬂect “best practice” (p. 16). Through this process
the community would be afforded inﬂuence over decisions, as the
project would “not proceed to development without the ongoing
support of the King Island community” (Hydro Tasmania 2013c, p.
15). The community engagement strategy involved a range of
speciﬁc engagement activities during the early stages of theTasWind proposal, commitments to ongoing community engage-
ment throughout the entirety of the proposal, and the requirement
of community support before proceeding to each stage of the
proposal process (Hydro Tasmania, 2012; Hydro Tasmania 2013a,
2013c) (Fig. 2).
Hydro Tasmania announced the proposal at the pre-feasibility
stage, when there was no certainty about the viability of the
project, and took early steps to engage the King Island community
in the decision-making process (Hydro Tasmania, 2014). A range of
meetings and information sessions were held throughout the de-
liberation period, local representatives of Hydro Tasmania were
based in the Island, a community consultative committee (the
TasWind Consultative Committee, or TWCC) was established and a
community vote was held on whether or not to proceed to the
feasibility stage (Hydro Tasmania 2013b, 2013c). These actions
reﬂect, at least superﬁcially, adherence to a higher-level, or ‘best
practice’, community engagement strategy where the community
is engaged early, there are a range of opportunities for dialogue
and collaboration, and the community is given decision-making
power over the future of the proposal. In spite of this, the King
Island experience was one of conﬂict, with strain on interpersonal
relationships, damage to local institutions, the formation of a local
opposition group (the No TasWind Farm Group, or NTWFG), legal
actions (taken by the NTWFG against the proponent), and the
eventual decision by Hydro Tasmania in October 2014 to not
proceed with the proposal due to economic factors (Hydro Tas-
mania, 2014). As engagement strategies which reﬂect higher-level
community engagement are expected to reduce conﬂict (Colvin
et al., 2016; Hindmarsh, 2010; Reed and Curzon, 2015), the
Fig. 2. An overview of the planned TasWind process including key early community engagement activities and the requirement for community support between phases
(content from: Hydro Tasmania, 2012; Hydro Tasmania 2013a).
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these outcomes, and what can be learned from the King Island
experience to improve the practice of community engagement for
wind energy and other sectors.3. Methods
This research project was aimed at understanding why the King
Island experience was characterised by dysfunctional social con-
ﬂict, despite the proponent's adoption of what was claimed to be a
‘best practice’ community engagement strategy. The aim for this
research was therefore two-fold. First, to develop a locally situated
and in-depth understanding of the TasWind community engage-
ment process. Second, based on this understanding, to examine
the hidden complexities and subtle drivers of the conﬂict in order
to learn from the King Island experience about the successes and
pitfalls of community engagement in land use change decision-
making.
To achieve this locally situated and in-depth understanding of
the King Island experience, a qualitative research design was
adopted. This involved visiting King Island in March–April 2015,
during which time in-depth interviews were conducted with 30
individuals from the King Island community (n¼30). As a local
perspective on the proposal was sought, external stakeholders
(e.g. company and interest group representatives) were not in-
terviewed. While immersion in the King Island community con-
tributed to a deep understanding of the local context, only formal
interview content was analysed.
A constructionist epistemology guided the research, in that the
differing perceptions of the King Island experience were sought
(e.g. Juerges and Newig, 2015). This was not for critique, but in
order to develop a nuanced, balanced, and well-rounded under-
standing of the issue (Moon and Blackman, 2014). The theoretical
lens through which the research was conducted was the social
identity approach. The social identity approach emphasises the
importance of group membership and the way groups interact in
shaping relationships, thereby affecting the outcome of processes
which are driven by intergroup interactions (Colvin et al., 2015b;
Fielding and Hornsey, 2016; Haslam, 2000). The approach in-
corporates themes such as: group formation; stigma; stereotyp-
ing; conforming to identity norms; consensus-seeking behaviour;
intergroup power differences; polarisation and extremism; com-
munication, and; intergroup deliberation (Bliuc et al., 2015; Colvin
et al., 2015b; Crane and Ruebottom, 2011; Fielding and Hornsey,
2016; Haslam, 2000; Hornsey, 2008; Mason et al., 2015; Rowley
and Moldoveanu, 2003; Unsworth and Fielding, 2014). A central
tenet of the social identity approach is the distinction between in-
groups and out-groups. An in-group is a group to which an in-
dividual belongs, while an out-group is a group to which theindividual does not belong (Colvin et al., 2015b; Fielding and
Hornsey, 2016). The social identity approach as a theoretical lens
for qualitative research has been found to be particularly suited to
research projects with an interest in understanding social context
and complexities (Jackson and Sherriff, 2013). The explicit decision
(see Braun and Clarke (2006)) to adopt the social identity ap-
proach as a theoretical lens informed interview development,
analysis and coding, and interpretation.
3.1. Interview development
In-depth interviews were developed around key topics, with
few speciﬁc questions. This was to allow for a conversational
structure to the interviews, and to have the ﬂexibility to pursue
unexpected themes as they arose (Bryman, 2012). This approach
was also adopted to allow the interview participants to discuss
their perceptions and experiences with limited questioning (which
could potentially be leading), in order to gain rich and authentic
insights. Probing questions, responsive to the participants’ an-
swers, were used to guide the interview and exhaust complex
topics. All interviews were conducted by the same researcher,
were recorded using a handheld note-taker device, stored on
password-protected hard drives, and later transcribed verbatim.
Sixteen participants were interviewed individually, and fourteen
participants were interviewed in pairs (seven paired interviews).
The ﬁve topics which were consistent for all interviews were:
 About the participant and King Island.
 What happened during the time of the TasWind proposal?
 Who was involved in discussions about the TasWind proposal?
 How was the participant personally engaged with the TasWind
proposal?
 What has happened after the TasWind proposal?
3.2. Participant recruitment
Interview participants were members of the King Island com-
munity, and represented a broad range of perspectives on the
proposal (from strong support to strong opposition, and including
ambivalence, uncertainty, and indifference). Recruitment of parti-
cipants occurred through making contact with key informants,
followed by snowballing. Key informants were identiﬁed initially
through the news media coverage of the TasWind proposal, and
further individuals were contacted based on inclusion in local di-
rectories. Information about the research project was shared with
local institutions and all interested individuals, with the invitation
to circulate with any King Islanders who would be interested in
participating or knowing more about the research. Not all people
contacted were interested or willing to participate. Of those who
were interested in the research, a great deal of goodwill and
Fig. 3. The phases and events of the TasWind proposal. Phases are rectangular, events are circles. NTWFG: No TasWind Farm Group. TWCC: TasWind Consultative
Committee.
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tional participants. This beneﬁtted from King Islanders identifying
others who would have interesting perspectives to contribute to
the research. Of note is that King Islanders across all stances on the
TasWind proposal were eager to assist with recruiting a broad
spectrum of views for participation in the research project. As the
issue was divisive, and not all King Islanders were engaged to the
same degree, care was taken to seek out a range of people to re-
present different levels of engagement and different stances on
the proposal. To protect the anonymity of participants from a small
community, demographic-type information is not presented and
direct quotations have not been included (Jones, 2014).
3.3. Analysis and coding
Interviews were coded using thematic analysis (Braun and
Clarke, 2006). Codes were based on insights while conducting
interviews and throughout the data analysis process, and on the
theory of the social identity approach. Theoretical analysis codes
related to the social identity approach were developed from the
literature, in particular Colvin et al. (2015b) and Haslam (2000),
and extended with Hogg and Abrams (1988) and Turner (1982).
The codebook for analysis was developed prior to commencing
analysis, based on the literature, reﬂections on ﬁeldwork experi-
ences, interview content, and research notes. The codebook was an
active tool, and was routinely updated throughout the data ana-
lysis process as codes were added, edited, or reorganised. The
codebook was developed, and all coding undertaken by, the ﬁrst
author in consultation with the co-authors of this study. All ana-
lysis was undertaken using NVivo 10 (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013;
QSR International, 2012).
3.4. Interpretation
Sense-making of the coded interviews into a narrative of the
King Island experience was conducted through gathering all in-
terview content related to each theme (‘queries’ on ‘nodes’ in
NVivo 10), and synthesising all perspectives from participants into
a multifaceted recount of the King Island experience. The social
identity approach informed the way in which the interviews were
interpreted and analysed. For example, polarisation was seen to be
a product of the interaction between the issue, i.e. TasWind, and
social psychological intergroup processes, rather than simply an
observed phenomenon. Emphasis was on identifying sequences or
causal links between discreet events, or between and within
phases of the TasWind proposal. An example of this is associating
the closure of the abattoir with the way in which the King Island
community appraised the merits and risks of the TasWind pro-
posal. An overview of the TasWind community engagement pro-
cess and key ﬁndings related to the hidden complexities and
subtle drivers of conﬂict in the King Island experience were thendrawn from the sense-making process based on the signiﬁcance of
these issues in the interviews (e.g. consistently reported across
participants, highly controversial across participants, or empha-
sised by participants as a major factor in the King Island
experience).4. Results and discussion
Results and discussion are integrated in this section, presented
as ﬁndings which will ﬁrst cover a chronological understanding of
the TasWind conﬂict from the local perspective, followed by key
factors which have been identiﬁed as drivers of the conﬂict in King
Island. A complete treatment of the complexity of the King Island
experience cannot be provided in this paper. As such, the ﬁndings
present those issues which are considered the most signiﬁcant
lessons for community engagement.
4.1. Understanding the TasWind proposal conﬂict in King Island
Viewed as an episode of local conﬂict, the TasWind proposal
can be understood as series of phases which are punctuated by
speciﬁc events, as described by the King Island community (Fig. 3).
This section presents a very brief overview of key phases and
events of the King Island conﬂict in order to situate the key ﬁnd-
ings of the research. This understanding was developed through
analysis of interviews, and can be viewed as a local perspective of
the events of the TasWind proposal in contrast with the stated
community engagement plan (see Fig. 2). Further detail is pro-
vided in the following section where lessons for community en-
gagement are discussed.
King Island's history provides the context within which the
proposal was understood. Long term population decline and eco-
nomic downturn present challenges for King Island. The branding
of King Island's eponymous cheese fostered a ‘clean and green’
place identity, which has encouraged growth in the tourism sector,
and the in-migration of new residents, especially ‘tree-changers’.
The abattoir closure in September 2012, though not part of the
TasWind proposal, was presented by most participants as the ﬁrst
key event relevant to understanding the TasWind proposal. Re-
sulting employment and economic losses made the King Island
community feel vulnerable, and gave a sense of urgency to the
need to ﬁnd a solution to the gap in the local industry and econ-
omy. There was a widely held perception that closure of the
abattoir caused the belief that ‘something’ was needed in order to
secure King Island's future.
Following closure of the abattoir, rumours about a $2 billion
project in King Island's future started to circulate throughout the
community and became a prominent topic of discussion. This
phase is the time of ‘the secret’. Speculation in lieu of knowledge
caused apprehension and aversion to change, with ‘the secret’
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In November 2012, a community meeting was held to an-
nounce the TasWind proposal, jointly between the King Island
Council and Hydro Tasmania. Much of the detail provided in the
announcement was conceptual, rather than speciﬁc, likely due to
the proposal being in the pre-feasibility stage.
Following the announcement, the TasWind proposal shifted
into the deliberation phase. This phase was characterised by con-
ﬂict within the King Island community, and involved a range of
meetings and information exchange which were both community-
driven and proponent-driven. Two major elements of this phase
include the formal consultation program, facilitated by Hydro
Tasmania, and the non-facilitated formation and mobilisation of a
local opposition group.
The formal consultation program included establishment by
Hydro Tasmania of the TasWind Consultative Committee (TWCC).
The TWCC comprised of 17 King Islanders, and functioned in-
dependently from Hydro Tasmania. The aim was to serve as a
neutral intermediary group between Hydro Tasmania and the King
Island community. There were mixed perceptions about the
TWCC, variously including that it was ‘pro-wind’ and ‘anti-wind’,
and a range of views about the efﬁcacy of the TWCC.
At the same time as the formal consultation program, a non-
facilitated local opposition group, the No TasWind Farm Group
(NTWFG) formed and mobilised against the proposal. The NTWFG
brought speakers to King Island, engaged with the national media,
conducted an election-style campaign in relation to the commu-
nity vote (outlined below), and initiated legal actions against Hy-
dro Tasmania. These activities all occurred outside of the formal
channels for community engagement.
The vote which was held in June 2013 by Hydro Tasmania to
gauge community support for the proposal proceeding to the
feasibility stage was a major event during the time of the TasWind
proposal, and was a signiﬁcant cause for campaigning by the
NTWFG, and wider contention. There were 878 votes cast by the
community. A Hydro Tasmania representative stated 60% was the
benchmark for the vote, however the results were returned at
58.7% in favour. Hydro Tasmania took this as adequate, and pro-
ceeded with the feasibility study. Some viewed this unfavourably;
the NTWFG in particular felt that the vote had categorically failed.
Following the vote, the NTWFG commenced legal actions
against Hydro Tasmania. The legal actions were based on the ar-
gument that Hydro Tasmania had broken their commitments to
the community by proceeding with the feasibility study having not
met the 60% level of support, and as such Hydro Tasmania did not
obtain a ‘social licence’ to proceed with the feasibility study. Al-
though the legal actions commenced, they were not resolved in
Court.
While the legal actions were underway, in late October 2014
Hydro Tasmania announced that the TasWind proposal would
cease. Exogenous economic factors solely were described as the
cause; social conﬂict and the NTWFG's legal actions were not ac-
knowledged. The cessation announcement was delivered in a
statement from Hobart-based upper-management of Hydro Tas-
mania, and disseminated through the news media and social
media. Reactions in the community were mixed.
In the aftermath since the cessation announcement (interviews
were conducted around 5 months following the cessation an-
nouncement), many say King Island is returning to what they view
as ‘normal’. King Island still needs to overcome the same chal-
lenges as before the TasWind proposal, but now with a more fa-
tigued community. Some say the Island is ‘re-merging’, while
others feel that below the surface there are irreparable social di-
vides which will endure with the current generation of King Is-
landers. TasWind - and wind energy development in King Island
more generally - has become a taboo.4.2. Factors driving dysfunctional conﬂict in King Island during the
community engagement process
4.2.1. Pre-feasibility engagement was problematic
The TasWind proposal was announced at the pre-feasibility
stage. As such, much of the detail provided in the announcement
was reported to be conceptual, rather than speciﬁc. Details in-
cluding the conditions under which the proposal would proceed
through feasibility and to development, the siting of turbines, the
nature of landholder agreements, and hosting payments were
reported to be not speciﬁed with certainty at the announcement,
due to the intention to develop these details through consultation
with the community. While this early engagement at the pre-
feasibility stage adheres to recommendations for higher-level
community engagement, there were aspects of this early engage-
ment which were problematic.
Announcing at a stage when speciﬁc details were undeﬁned
caused a lack of certainty about the scope of the proposal (e.g.
scale and extent of impact, timeframe, ﬁnancials, fairness), leading
to anxiety in the community. This was true both at the time of, and
immediately after, the announcement of the proposal and per-
sisted throughout the following deliberation phase. In the absence
of knowledge about the impacts of the proposal on individuals,
speculation led to circulation of misinformation and rumours in
the community. At the announcement and pre-feasibility stage,
Hydro Tasmania representatives were unable to answer some
speciﬁc questions. The perceived lack of answers was not viewed
favourably by some who felt that this represented unpreparedness
and a lack of professionalism. Others felt that this indicated that
Hydro Tasmania had believed the community would ‘passively
accept’ the proposal, so had not gone to the effort to be prepared
to answer questions.
These issues were compounded by ‘the secret’, which had
made many people anxious about an unknown future change
(speculation on possible projects at this time included: another
abattoir, an immigration or refugee centre, offshore wave energy
development, a prison farm, nuclear waste storage, a sand mine,
an intelligence/spy facility, and gas drilling). Some members of the
community were described as being primed by ‘the secret’ to au-
tomatically oppose whatever was announced, while others were
disappointed at the time of the announcement to learn that the
secret proposal was not their preferred speculative project. Be-
cause the announcement was made jointly by Hydro Tasmania and
the King Island Council in a ‘town hall’ style forum, it was per-
ceived that the Council had already promised community support
for the project. This style of forum is considered a risk for suc-
cessful community engagement, as it can allow dominance of only
the loudest voices and encourage conﬂict (Hall et al., 2015). This, in
combination with ‘the secret’ being linked to the Council, led to a
view that the entire project was a fait accompli and community
consultation was tokenistic at best. The view held by some of
Hydro Tasmania as a powerful out-group, in the sense of the social
identity approach, caused cynicism about the motives behind
TasWind, and beliefs that any beneﬁts for Hydro Tasmania must
necessitate losses for King Islanders (Fielding and Hornsey, 2016;
Haslam 2000). Combined with ‘the secret’, this immediately per-
ceived power imbalance and view of Hydro Tasmania as an out-
group operating within the space of King Island meant that efforts
for building the trust critical to successful community engagement
started on the back foot.
Engagement from pre-feasibility about whether to proceed to a
feasibility stage meant that there were different perspectives
about the purpose of Hydro Tasmania's engagement. Those who
were cynical about the motives behind the TasWind proposal felt
that the question of proceeding to feasibility was a red herring, and
felt that if the community consented to the feasibility study then it
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project development (despite Hydro Tasmania's statements to the
contrary). Additionally, framing the discussion around whether
the proposal should proceed to feasibility to some extent fa-
cilitated those who intended to de-legitimise opposition. This oc-
curred because the opposition view that consenting to feasibility
would mean consent to development (or that opposing feasibility
was the ﬁrst necessary step in opposing the project in its entirety)
was challenged by the argument that opposing a feasibility study
was in effect opposing information. This caused debate in the
community where different issues were being argued (e.g. ‘yes to a
feasibility study’ versus ‘no to project’), and these misaligned
perspectives about the TasWind proposal ampliﬁed tensions in the
community. In controversial environmental management issues,
positions or stances (e.g. support or opposition) can become their
own social identities, and this can serve to escalate conﬂict and
lessen the prospect for a conciliatory outcome (Fielding and
Hornsey, 2016). In the King Island experience, the misaligned
perspectives (‘yes to a feasibility study’ and ‘no to project’) not only
served to confound debate and undermine the potential for a
common ground for dialogue, but also provided the architecture
for position-based identities which facilitate exacerbation of in-
tergroup conﬂict.
With hindsight, some King Islanders felt that Hydro Tasmania
should have completed the feasibility study without announcing
the proposal or engaging with the community, as this would have
avoided unnecessary anxiety in the community and would have
allowed for consideration of a completed proposal. This runs
contrary to other research indicating that communities value early
engagement (e.g. Soma and Haggett, 2015), emphasising the im-
portance of pairing early engagement with sound process to avoid
early misinformation (e.g. ‘the secret’) and misaligned perspectives
on the purpose for engagement.
4.2.2. The community committee lacked a third-party facilitator
Establishment of a consultative committee (TasWind Con-
sultative Committee, TWCC) was another way in which the Tas-
Wind proposal incorporated recommendations for higher-level
community engagement (Clean Energy Council, 2013; Howard
2015; Jami and Walsh, 2014). The TWCC was established by Hydro
Tasmania to serve as an intermediary group between Hydro Tas-
mania and the King Island community. The TWCC was comprised
of 17 people from the King Island community, and members were
recruited through response to a call for Expressions of Interest for
participation following announcement of the proposal. A chair-
person, deputy and secretary for the committee were elected from
among the committee members at the ﬁrst meeting of the TWCC.
The TWCC undertook a range of activities, primarily including (but
among others): organising community meetings to identify com-
munity questions; research on community questions (in-
dependent of information provided by Hydro Tasmania), and;
dissemination of ﬁndings to the community.
Perceptions about the neutrality of the committee to the Tas-
Wind proposal were mixed. There was a range of views, including
that the TWCC was primarily comprised of anti-wind people, and
that the TWCC was primarily comprised of pro-wind people. There
were others who felt that pro-wind people were sought by Hydro
Tasmania for participation with some token anti-wind people in-
cluded to give the impression of balance. Other people felt that the
TWCC was ‘hijacked’ by anti-wind interests, and that the com-
mittee presented biased information to the community.
These perceptions of a lack of neutrality in the TWCC con-
tributed to the divide in the community during the time of the
TasWind proposal, and this was particularly related to disputes
about contested information. For example, perceptions that the
TWCC was split between pro-wind and anti-wind people led someto view the messaging from the TWCC as mixed and therefore not
authoritative. The perceived pro-/anti-wind split was also the
cause for some people to believe that the TWCC was ineffective in
achieving its aims. This view was attributed to view that in-
formation from the TWCC was not communicated effectively to
the community, i.e. the lack of consensus within the group meant
that messaging from the TWCC to the community was unclear.
Of note is that the chairperson, deputy chairperson, and se-
cretary of the TWCC were from the King Island community. While
the mixed opinions about the neutrality or otherwise of the TWCC
indicate that whether or not the TWCC had a bias for or against the
TasWind proposal is a matter of perspective, the lack of a facil-
itator independent of King Island and Hydro Tasmania may have
contributed to the various and sometimes unfavourable views of
the TWCC, and indeed this was considered by some in the com-
munity to be the case. This point is not to imply that the TWCC
leaders lacked objectivity, rather, the perception of the potential
for bias served to undermine the efﬁcacy of the committee. In-
formation communicated by a perceived out-group is likely to be
dismissed due to identity-based distrust of the out-group (Fielding
and Hornsey, 2016; Haslam, 2000). In the King Island experience,
allowing the TWCC to be perceived as biased, regardless of the
actual value of the TWCC's work, meant that information dis-
seminated by the TWCC was treated with suspicion and
uncertainty.
The importance of a third-party facilitator in wind energy
community engagement has been emphasised by Fast et al. (2016),
Hindmarsh and Matthews (2008) and Howard (2015). While es-
tablishment of community committees has been argued as a way
to overcome or bypass conﬂict and improve democratic outcomes
(Fast et al., 2016; Howard, 2015), in the King Island experience the
decision to not lead the TWCC with a third-party facilitator con-
tributed to the perceptions that the TWCC was biased or in-
effective. This undermined the opportunity for positive outcomes
through establishment of a consultative committee, and con-
tributed to the escalation of local conﬂict.
4.2.3. A vote seemed democratic, but it polarised the community
As a way to measure the King Island community's support for
the TasWind proposal proceeding to the feasibility stage, a com-
munity vote was held. It was reported that the vote was not in-
itially part of the TasWind engagement plan (though a community
survey was to be held to gauge community views on the proposal),
and that the use of this technique for measuring community
support was pursued primarily by the TWCC. The vote was to be
overseen by Australia's federal agency responsible for managing
elections (Australian Electoral Commission, AEC), with eligibility
for voting based on the electoral roll. This arrangement was con-
troversial, as it was reported that newer residents who were not
yet registered were ineligible to vote. The NTWFG and TWCC both
argued in favour of extending the list of eligible voters to include
newer residents, and an alternative arrangement was made to
allow all King Island rent-payers or rate-payers to vote via the King
Island Council. However, as this was no longer adhering to the
AEC's rules, the AEC withdrew from administering the vote and an
external polling organisation was engaged by Hydro Tasmania.
Despite this adjustment to address the voiced community
concerns, many people were still dissatisﬁed with the rules for
eligibility. It was reported that the rate-payer or rent-payer cri-
terion meant that short term residents were able to vote, including
transient workers who permanently left the Island shortly after
the vote was held. There was also the perception that the extended
rules allowed people who were not King Island residents, but were
landowners, to temporarily move to King Island (or undertake
paperwork to this effect, e.g. changing formal place of residence
details) to become eligible, vote, then leave the Island again. To
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the eligibility rules led to the view that the vote was illegitimate,
and that it was allowing people who were not part of the King
Island community to inﬂuence the outcome of the vote. Hydro
Tasmania was seen to ‘bend over backwards’ to accommodate
demands from the NTWFG and the TWCC, though this was viewed
as a factor which led to the reliability of the vote being under-
mined through renegotiation of the rules throughout the process.
In addition to issues with perceived legitimacy, the vote was
viewed as a major factor which exacerbated the conﬂict in the
King Island community. Conﬂict exacerbation was experienced
because the dichotomous nature of a vote led to election style
campaigning, attributed especially to the NTWFG who were pro-
moting a ‘no’ vote to the King island community. The NTWFG
viewed their campaigning as necessary action to gain a voice
ahead of the vote, however, the campaigning was seen to shift the
conﬂict about the TasWind proposal from being between the
NTWFG and Hydro Tasmania to being between the ‘yes camp’ and
the ‘no camp’ (the label ‘no camp’ was used interchangeably with
the NTWFG) in the King Island community. In this way, the vote
promoted an intergroup, ‘us versus them’, frame of the conﬂict
within the community.
The dichotomous nature of a vote also led to polarisation of the
community. In holding a vote, it meant that all community
members were expected to commit to either a yes vote or a no
vote. This expectation had the effect of closing down debate as any
opinions in the ‘grey area’ had the caveat that when it came to the
time to vote, the decision would have to go one way or the other.
In effect, this meant that all King Islanders would be required to
cast their vote and adopt a position-based identity. From the social
identity perspective, holding a vote may be viewed as a process
which forces position-based identiﬁcation on those who vote.
Position-based identiﬁcation emphasises polarisation and in a
conﬂictual context can cause extremism of views on the issue,
particularly through encouraging in-group insularity which can
lead to conforming to identity norms, and stereotyping of others
around their position-based identity (Colvin et al., 2015b; Fielding
and Hornsey, 2016). Stereotyping places an emphasis on the di-
vision between the in-group and out-group which encourages
group members to conform to their position-based identity norms
(Bliuc et al., 2015; Fielding and Hornsey, 2016; Mason, 2015). This
can see groups deprioritising critical evaluation of a range of
perspectives, as they seek consensus for group unity (Colvin et al.,
2015b), thereby serving to ossify the position-based identity
groups into polarised and extreme stances (Haslam, 2000).
Prior to the vote, speculation about others’ voting intentions,
pressure on people to disclose their voting intentions, and at-
tempts by some people to inﬂuence how others would vote further
divided the community. Having the responsibility given to the
community via a vote for the decision on whether or not to pro-
ceed to the feasibility stage meant that debates about the TasWind
proposal became decidedly personal. The personal nature of the
debate inﬂuenced what was described as a lower than expected
participation rate (some stated that around half of the population
voted, though the number of total eligible voters is not known).
While apathy (or passive acceptance) may have been seen as an
explanation for this, some people suggested signiﬁcant levels of
boycotting due to both perceptions of illegitimacy and an unwill-
ingness of people to commit themselves to a yes or no vote. The
self-protective action of avoiding the stigma of a position-based
identity through abstinence from voting was viewed as a safer
option amid the social conﬂict.
One of the most controversial aspects of the vote was described
by the participants as the measure of majority community support.
Local Hydro Tasmania representatives had indicated that a ma-
jority was sought, however during a public meeting, where avisiting (non-local) Hydro Tasmania representative was speaking, a
community member asked for speciﬁcation of what constituted a
majority. At this point, the representative was described as making
an ‘off the cuff’ response, and said that 60% would be considered a
majority. The perceived spontaneity of the statement demon-
strated to some that the community had little power over the
process through which their consent for the TasWind proposal
was being assessed. This spontaneity was also seen to demonstrate
to some people that the local Hydro Tasmania representatives
were not those who held the decision-making power with regards
to the TasWind proposal.
The result of the vote was 58.7% in favour of the TasWind
proposal proceeding to the feasibility stage. With 878 votes cast by
the community (EMRS, 2013), the difference between 58.7% and
60% was the equivalent of around 12 individual votes. This out-
come was viewed by some people as being short of the 60%
benchmark, but close enough, and still demonstrative of majority
community support for the proposal. However, others viewed it as
categorically failing to meet the 60% benchmark, and therefore as
evidence that the community did not express a level of support
adequate for progression through to the feasibility stage. The way
in which the result of the vote was framed (i.e. as ‘close enough
with a majority’ or ‘failed, due to not achieving 60%’) caused
controversy about the outcome, and was reported to have fuelled
further social conﬂict within the King Island community. The de-
cision by Hydro Tasmania to proceed with the feasibility study
meant that these different framings of the vote outcome were not
just differences in interpretation, but became major differences in
opinion with regards to the legitimacy of the TasWind proposal
and trustworthiness of Hydro Tasmania. This decision was also the
cause for the NTWFG to initiate legal actions against Hydro Tas-
mania (which were not resolved in court).
Voting (or local referenda) has been identiﬁed as a potential
means for improving local empowerment in wind energy deci-
sion-making (Fast et al., 2016; Jami and Walsh, 2014; Simcock,
2014). However, there has been little examination in the literature
of the outcomes and value of a community vote. This is likely due
to the relative rarity of community votes on wind energy projects
(Jeong et al., 2012). Hall and Jeanneret (2015), suggest that asking
for explicit approval from a community is daunting to industry. In
a Swiss study, it was found that a community vote had little effect
on the social acceptability of wind energy proposals (Walter,
2014). Jeong et al. (2012) and Simcock (2014) discuss positive
outcomes following a community vote, though this was in a
community-owned wind energy development, unlike the TasWind
situation of a government-owned corporate and external propo-
nent. A vote may appear to be a familiar and democratic method
through which community perspectives can be shared. However,
as higher-level approaches to community engagement promote
‘consensus-building’, where knowledge is exchanged and shared
understandings are created (Clean Energy Council, 2013; Hind-
marsh 2010; IAP2, 2015), the divisiveness of the vote indicates that
this approach may not be considered to adhere to expectations of
higher-level community engagement. Bell et al. (2005) caution
that a vote may lead to politicisation of a wind energy develop-
ment, and this was the case for the King Island experience. A vote
which appeared to be a democratic way to measure community
support instead caused agitation about process and voter elig-
ibility, which undermined the legitimacy of the vote. The dichot-
omous nature polarised the community as the vote closed down
debate and triggered election-style campaigning within King Is-
land. The decision to proceed with the feasibility study despite not
achieving the stated outcome of the vote served as proof to some
that the engagement process was disingenuous, and provided
another point of intractability within the community.
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facilitated channels
During the deliberation phase and in addition to, and separate
from, the Hydro Tasmania-led community engagement processes,
a group of concerned community members formed the No Tas-
Wind Farm Group (NTWFG) to oppose the TasWind proposal. It
was reported that at the time of the announcement, some King
Islanders felt anxious about the nature of the proposal, so an un-
ofﬁcial meeting was held which led to the formation of the
NTWFG. Concerns predominantly included views (among others)
that the proposal would: industrialise the agrarian landscape,
impact negatively on human health and wellbeing, undermine
community cohesion, and impact negatively on wildlife (especially
migratory birds). These concerns are not dissimilar to issues raised
by other wind energy development opponents (e.g. Anderson,
2013; Botterill and Cockﬁeld, 2016; Fast et al., 2016; Hindmarsh
and Matthews, 2008; Ogilvie and Roots, 2015; Wheeler, 2016).
However, the NTWFG were broadly accepting of and positive
about the pre-existing wind energy development in King Island at
Huxley Hill due to the local beneﬁts from the energy generated
and the relatively small scale of the turbines (see Fig. 1).
For those who were members of the NTWFG, it was reported
that their motives for group formation included that they felt a
group was necessary in order to effectively counter the power
and resources of Hydro Tasmania. Additionally, some felt that a
formal group was necessary in order to demonstrate to Hydro
Tasmania that they were committed in their opposition and that
their concerns should be taken seriously. Group formation also
provided social identity based challenges and beneﬁts for group
members. Identiﬁcation with a controversial group is known to
precede stigma against group members (Haslam, 2000), though
in-group bonding also provides emotional support for members
and motivation to pursue the group's aims. Both outcomes of
group formation were reported to have been the case for NTWFG
members.
The NTWFG drew on experiences from other places to inform
their approach to opposing the TasWind proposal. For example,
community opposition to expansion of the coal seam gas industry
in other parts of Australia (e.g. Colvin et al., 2015a; Lacey and La-
mont, 2014) was used as an analogy to the NTWFG perspective
and experience with TasWind in King Island. This ﬁts with a social
identity approach model of referent informational inﬂuence,
where an identity group will draw from the experiences of others
with a shared identity. While they have no direct personal con-
nection, the shared identity (e.g. local land use change opposition
group) allows for learning from experiences and conformance to
norms of the shared identity (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Turner,
1982 and e.g. Burningham et al., 2014).
Formation of the NTWFG reﬂects a perceived intergroup power
imbalance between Hydro Tasmania and the King Island commu-
nity, an issue ﬂagged by Devine-Wright (2014) as critical in many
wind energy development conﬂicts. The NTWFG viewed the
power dynamic as a large corporate proponent disingenuously
using community engagement processes in order to obtain a social
licence to operate. This view reﬂects Hindmarsh's, (2010) critique
of institutions of community engagement for wind energy in
Australia, which argues practices are more aimed at persuasion,
rather than dialogue. To the NTWFG, formation as a group and
subsequent campaigning and other activities were seen as neces-
sary in order to counter this power imbalance. However, to much
of the rest of the King Island community, the actions taken by the
NTWFG were viewed as creating a new power imbalance; that of
between the NTWFG and ‘everyone else’. This was due to the
ampliﬁcation of the NTWFG voice through forming a group and
taking strategic action to oppose the TasWind proposal. Others felt
that the NTWFG perspective crowded out the voices of others inthe King Island community who were not as resolute in their view
of the TasWind proposal.
Outside of the TWCC, the NTWFG was the only community-
based group to form in relation to the TasWind proposal. There
were reports of an informal ‘yes camp’, which tended to be a
nebulous group of the vocal supporters of the TasWind proposal.
Based on reports, the ‘yes camp’ was a label applied to known
supporters of the proposal who were engaged in the TasWind
process, not a grouping adopted formally (or informally). The
difference between the levels of engagement with the ‘yes camp’
and the NTWFG reﬂects a lack of space provided in the community
engagement process for strong opposition. Jami and Walsh (2014)
indicate that facilitating opposition voices is important in com-
munity engagement for wind energy developments. Hindmarsh
(2010), similarly, argues that a lack of attentiveness to the con-
cerns of local community-based opposition groups is a signiﬁcant
limitation of community engagement for wind energy develop-
ment. In the King Island experience, those who joined the NTWFG
did not feel that the extent of their opposition to the proposal was
given a ‘place’ in the deliberative process. The lack of a place for
the NTWFG view meant that the NTWFG operated outside of the
formalised and facilitated community engagement processes;
undertaking actions which were seen by many to have ex-
acerbated the local conﬂict (e.g. election-style campaigning ahead
of the vote, engaging with the national news media, bringing to
King Island controversial speakers, and undertaking legal actions
against Hydro Tasmania). It is important to note that it is possible
and likely the NTWFG would have mobilised regardless of the
community engagement strategy, due to their view that the scale
of the TasWind proposal made it fundamentally incompatible with
King Island (e.g. Devine-Wright, 2014; Fast et al., 2016).
The operation of the NTWFG outside of the facilitated com-
munity engagement meant that those with the NTWFG perspec-
tive of TasWind were informed by different information and per-
spectives compared to those who were engaged in the process.
Mobilised groups with a strong social identity will seek author-
itative sources which reﬂect the group norms and understandings
(Haslam, 2000). When these sources are not shared with out-
groups, different truths will serve to entrench conﬂict and un-
dermine the potential for common ground (Fielding and Hornsey,
2016). For example, the NTWFG coordinated with broader groups
and networks promoting an anti-wind agenda and invited at least
one speaker associated with this network to King Island (see, e.g.,
Ogilvie and Rootes, 2015). Locally, heightened tensions and con-
troversy followed the speakers’ visits to King Island.
With the NTWFG operating outside of the formal space for
community engagement, there were few opportunities for NTWFG
and others in the community to exchange views outside of high-
tension settings such as community meetings. As a result, ste-
reotyping of out-group members and suspicion about out-group
members’ motives was promoted due to the lack of a shared space
for deliberation. NTWFG's literature regarding potential impacts of
the TasWind proposal was disseminated throughout their mem-
bership and the broader King Island community, often with claims
at odds with information coming from Hydro Tasmania and the
TWCC. These actions outside of any place within the community
engagement process were viewed by the NTWFG as a necessary
means to balance power with Hydro Tasmania, but nonetheless
were considered to have contributed to contested information,
confusion, and the exacerbation of local conﬂict.
4.2.5. Local context is a critical factor, and the conﬂict legacy re-
mains in King Island
The local context into which the TasWind proposal was an-
nounced was critical to the response from the community to the
proposal. The abattoir closure, while independent of the TasWind
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story. The closure of the abattoir increased the stress and vulner-
ability of the King Island community (e.g. Oncescu, 2015). When
the TasWind proposal was announced within the same year, this
vulnerability led to the framing of the TasWind proposal both as a
potential ‘life-raft’ for the local economy, and as an attempt by a
large corporate entity to capitalise on the Island's misfortune.
During the deliberation phase, commitments by Hydro Tasmania
to make ﬁnancial contributions to redevelopment of a local abat-
toir and expansion of the local port were seen by some as being a
responsible gesture to the community, while others viewed this as
akin to bribery. Hydro Tasmania also became the naming rights
sponsor of the local marathon the ‘Imperial 20’, leading to the
marathon being renamed to the ‘Hydro Tasmania Imperial 20’. For
those who were opposed to the TasWind proposal, this was seen
to be insensitive, and made the TasWind conﬂict present at an
otherwise unrelated important community event. This experience
is not unique to the King Island experience; while Soma and
Haggett (2015) and Devine-Wright (2009) found that proponent
funding of local projects can be viewed as appropriate and re-
sponsible, Fast et al. (2016) and Cass et al. (2010) encountered the
view among opponents of such actions as being a ‘bribe’.
Latent social cleavages became toxic during the time of the
TasWind proposal. It is known from the social identity approach
that pre-existing social identities will be drawn on in situations
when they become meaningful for intergroup relations (Colvin
et al., 2015b; Haslam, 2000). Those who opposed the proposal,
particularly NTWFG members, were routinely categorised as the
‘blow-ins’ (i.e. residents who had just recently ‘blown in’ to King
Island). Prior to the TasWind proposal this term had been used
more playfully to describe newcomers. In the TasWind context,
‘blow-ins’ became a pejorative termwhich carried the connotation
that newcomers did not understand King Island the way the ‘true
King Islanders’ did. The ‘blow-ins’ label was embraced and re-
deﬁned by some to mean those who appreciated King Island so
much they chose to move there, in distinction from the people
with more extensive family histories in the Island. When re-
deﬁning a stigmatised social identity, if the identity (e.g. ‘blow-in’)
is viewed as ﬁxed, creatively changing the connotations of the
identity can serve as a means to destigmatise and emphasise po-
sitive attributes of the stereotype. Although there was acknowl-
edgement that these stereotypes were inaccurate (e.g. some
newcomers were open to the proposal, and some long-term Is-
landers opposed the proposal), the toxic nature of these stereo-
types contributed to division in the community and disguised the
complexity of people and opinions from both sides.
Consideration of the local context should not be limited to
what came before the TasWind proposal. The events during the
time of the proposal inﬂuenced nominations for, and who was
elected during, the local Council election; for which voting closed
the day following the TasWind cessation announcement. In its
aftermath, discussion of the TasWind proposal became a local ta-
boo, and this tension carried over to discussion of wind energy
more broadly. Some feel that in the aftermath of the TasWind
proposal, King Island is a less desirable place for future investment
more broadly, and the TasWind proposal has affected local atti-
tudes to local golf-tourism developments. Local institutions were
damaged, and interpersonal relationships broken or strained. Ef-
fects on the community continue, and while some feel that the
relationships are mending, others describe a more subtle and
long-term erosion of community cohesion and trust. The ongoing
effects may be related to the lack of a formal closure activity for
King Island, a factor which was identiﬁed by some as con-
spicuously absent (while the announcement was made at a town
hall meeting with involvement of the King Island Council, the
cessation announcement was made via an online Hydro Tasmaniamedia release and disseminated through the news media, social
media, and social networks). The social identity approach indicates
that for the long-term, the community may require reemphasis on
a superordinate identity, as King Islanders, which embraces the
diversity of views on the TasWind proposal (Colvin et al., 2015b;
Fielding and Hornsey, 2016; Haslam, 2000).
These ﬁndings emphasise the need for an understanding of the
local context into which wind energy developments, and other
land use changes, are proposed (Paveglio et al., 2016; Soma and
Haggett, 2015). This is both in order to understand how local
context and idiosyncrasies will affect the community response to a
proposal, and to understand how the conﬂict legacy of such a
proposal will affect the community in the longer term (Colvin
et al., 2015b; Paveglio et al., 2016). Additionally, Hall and Jeanneret
(2015) recommend consideration of how the conﬂict legacy of a
single issue can affect perceptions of the entire industry. A shift
from a project-centric view of community as the project's context
to a community view of the project as part of the local history is
necessary to situate proposals within their local context and
reality.5. Conclusions and policy implications
The King Island experience of the TasWind proposal was
complex, and this paper cannot claim to present a complete dis-
cussion of the multifaceted nature of the local conﬂict and com-
munity engagement process. Nevertheless, the ﬁve key ﬁndings
have signiﬁcant implications for community engagement in wind
energy developments and other land use changes. In particular,
these ﬁndings are instructive for methodological consideration
when designing speciﬁc engagement actions. We feel these ﬁnd-
ings also demonstrate the potential for a local-based perspective
to inform evaluation of community engagement, and to provide
insight into the level across the spectrum of public participation to
which an engagement strategy adheres.
The complications relating to the announcement of the pro-
posal at the pre-feasibility stage emphasise the importance of
sound process to manage confounding elements and misaligned
perceptions. A community-based consultative committee ap-
peared to have its efﬁcacy undermined due to perceptions about
potential bias, which may have been avoided if a third-party fa-
cilitator led the committee. A community vote which appeared to
be a democratic technique served to further polarise the com-
munity, and nuances of process were described as undermining
the legitimacy of the vote. An apparent lack of a formal space for
the local opposition in decision-making meant that the local op-
position group acted outside of the facilitated community en-
gagement process, and this contributed to conﬂict escalation. An
understanding of the local context was found to be critical not just
to inform how the proposal would be received, but to appreciate
the longer-term impacts of the conﬂict legacy. Achieving this ne-
cessitates prioritising a community-centric view of the project
ahead of a project-centric view of the community.
These insights were found through use of the social identity
approach as a theoretical lens, demonstrating the value of this
approach to understanding the complexities of social conﬂict
about environmental and natural resources management issues.
These ﬁndings can inform future strategies for community en-
gagement processes with the aim of achieving outcomes which
are satisfactory both to the proponents of sustainable develop-
ments, and to local communities.
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